Wednesday, January 30, 2008

PM Chart of the Day

Chart and quote from Volokh

Consider the figure below. It aggregates a total of 145,388 trades on Major League Baseball games in 2005. Each contract would pay off $10.00 if the specified team won the game.

The x-axis represents different transaction prices, and the y-axis shows, for all trades at that price or up to 10 cents higher, the probability that the team in fact won the game. Note that the points conform fairly closely to a 45-degree line.

This doesn't prove that prediction markets are perfect predictors....

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Monday, January 28, 2008

Hubdub Debuts at DEMO 2008

The Digg of PMs has launched. Zdnet blog on the firm:
“Hubdub lets people follow news over time and get forecasts on how news stories turn out,” company co-founder Nigel Eccles told me.

Hubdub, founded in November last year and headquartered Edinburgh, UK, allows users to formulate questions–such as ‘Will Apple introduce a tablet PC?’ or ‘Who will win the Florida Republican primary?’–and the community wagers on predictions with Hubdub dollars.

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Thursday, January 24, 2008

The New Breed of SPE’s

This WSJ article about ACA Capital Holding, shows financial firms adeptness in managing their balance sheet. ACA, ostensibly an insurance firm, was undercapitalized from the beginning. Based on the firm’s ‘A’ credit rating, the firm has a veneer of security which fell apart when S&P downgraded them to triple-C in December – a canary in the subprime coalmine. To avoid collapse, the firm is negotiating with the banks to avoid posting collateral.

Why would a bank go to such an undercapitalized firm for insurance? The WSJ gives this answer which sounds very much like SPE’s Enron used before its own collapse:

Investment banks paid ACA annual fees for bearing the risk in their debt securities. This shielded them from the impact of market-price fluctuations, so the banks didn’t have to reflect such fluctuations in their earnings reports.
As long as ACA kept its single-A rating, the banks didn’t require ACA to post collateral even if the securities it insured slipped in value. It’s different if a hedge fund, which doesn’t have a credit rating, is selling the insurance. In that case, each time the security insured falls in value, the hedge fund may be asked to put up more collateral.

Enron followers remember Special Purpose Entities as companies which were used to manage earning and to avoid reporting losses. They weren’t illegal. These related parties met the letter of the law, while violating the spirit and were instrumental in the collapse of the firm.

Essentially, they existed so Enron could avoid posting certain debts and showing less volatility. If the SPE’s had enough outside equity (3%) to be considered independent they did not have to be consolidated on Enron’s balance sheet. Enron crammed the SPE’s full of junk it didn’t want and couldn’t offload anywhere else.

ACA’s performed the same function. If everything is going up, the system works. ACA profits since they don’t have to make good on any policies, and the banks get to move junk (and its volatility) off their balance sheets. But when the market turned sour and all of the subprime securities moved down in unison, the equity was quickly used up and the firm collapsed. As Enron’s SPEs weren’t really independent, ACA was never really an insurance firm.

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Friday, January 18, 2008

WeatherBill's Success

While it's not a PM, WeatherBill seems to be doing well. This article mentions trade sizes in the tens of thousands, much larger than any weather-based contracts available on intrade.

On WeatherBill.com there is nothing about trading or contracts. The focus is on what a customer is interested in: a custom solution to hedge against weather.
Unlike companies that sell weather insurance or futures based on the weather, San Francisco-based WeatherBill lets companies create weather-specific coverage for their business.

Initially, energy companies used them as a hedge against unusually cool summers or warm winters, when energy consumption might be low.

Soon, corporate America embraced the concept and weather futures began trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. But at that level, the contracts were complex and expensive, shutting out small firms.

That's where WeatherBill and others stepped in with customized derivatives. Clients pay a one-time premium that amounts to a percentage of the revenue the company wants to protect. WeatherBill has hundreds of clients, so the odds of payouts are in WeatherBill's favor.

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Saturday, January 12, 2008

Five Reasons the Prediction Market Critics Are Wrong.

New PM post excerpt below. Read the full post at Midasoracle

1. It really was an upset
– As it has been pointed out elsewhere, the Clinton victory was a surprise to everyone....

2. Pundits/Critics are NOT traders...

3. PMs are not polls – This common mistake is exemplified by this quote from the Chicago Tribune, “The New Hampshire primary was a reminder that prediction markets, where bettors are putting money on the line, can have no more value than opinion polls, where participation costs nothing.” This critic missed the point and doesn’t realize he is comparing apples and oranges....

4. Regulations have hurt the accuracy and liquidity of PMs – The inconvenience of opening a trading account at Intrade has excluded many Americans from participating....

5. “Serious people who study or work with these markets are not in the ‘markets are magic’ camp” – Prediction markets are like other financial markets: fat tails, black swans, bubbles, “manipulations” etc. ...

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